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Abstract
In Tanzania, the health financing system is extremely fragmented with strategies in place to supple-
ment funds provided from the central level. One of these strategies is the Community Health Fund
(CHF), a voluntary health insurance scheme for the informal rural sector. As its implementation has
been challenging, we investigated different CHF implementation practices and how these practices
and the wider health financing context affect CHF implementation and potentially enrolment. Two
councils were purposively selected for this study. Routine data relevant for understanding CHF im-
plementation in the wider health financing context were collected at council and public health facil-
ity level. Additionally, an economic costing approach was used to estimate CHF administration
cost and analyse its financing sources. Our results showed the importance of considering different
CHF implementation practices and the wider health financing context when looking at CHF per-
formance. Exemption policies and healthcare-seeking behaviour influenced negatively the max-
imum potential enrolment rate of the voluntary CHF scheme. Higher revenues from user fees, user
fee policies and fund pooling mechanisms might have furthermore set incentives for care pro-
viders to prioritize user fees over CHF revenues. Costing results clearly pointed out the lack of fi-
nancial sustainability of the CHF. The financial analysis however also showed that thanks to signifi-
cant contributions from other health financing mechanisms to CHF administration, the CHF could
be left with more than 70% of its revenues for financing services. To make the CHF work, major
improvements in CHF implementation practices would be needed, but given the wider health
financing context and healthcare-seeking behaviours, it is questionable whether such improve-
ments are feasible, scalable and value for money. Thus, our results call for a reconsideration of
approaches taken to address the challenges in health financing and demonstrate that the CHF can-
not be looked at as a stand-alone system.
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Introduction
Following the publication of the World Health Report 2010 and the
formulation of the health-related Sustainable Development Goal 3,
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) has gained high priority globally
(World Health Organization, 2010; Sustainable Development
Solution Network, 2015). UHC implies that everyone has access to
needed health services of sufficient quality to be effective without
incurring financial hardship (World Health Organization, 2010).
However, many low- and middle-income countries have been strug-
gling to implement sustainable health financing strategies. A major
problem is the informal nature of their economies, which makes rev-
enue collection to fund health systems difficult. Underlying mecha-
nisms of health financing systems also pose challenges (World
Health Organization, 2013). The basis to address these challenges
lies in the in-depth understanding of the context-specific and often
complex designs and implementation practices of existing health
financing systems (World Health Organization, 2010, 2013).
In Tanzania, the healthcare system primarily depends on central
level funding coming from tax revenues or external donors (Dutta,
2015). There are also several insurance schemes and out-of-pocket
payments account for around 23% of total health expenditure
(World Health Organization, 2014). Overall, the health financing
system is extremely fragmented, both in terms of insurance schemes
and within the central level funding system (McIntyre et al., 2008;
Haazen, 2012; Borghi et al., 2013; Dutta, 2015). User fees paid out
of pocket are levied at the point of access, whereby the councils de-
fine the amount to be paid in their user fee policies. National exemp-
tion policies stipulate that the poor and other priority groups
(children under five, pregnant women, elderly above 60 and people
with certain disease conditions, including chronic illnesses, HIV/
AIDS, TB and leprosy) are supposed to receive free services at public
health facilities (Mubyazi, 2004). All public servants are compulsor-
ily enrolled in the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)
(McIntyre et al., 2008). Voluntary insurance schemes include the
Community Health Funds (CHFs) for the informal rural population
(Haazen, 2012). Each council is responsible for administrating its
own CHF and defining the benefit package and flat rate premium
per year. The CHF scheme covers a whole household. CHF funds
raised are doubled through matching grants from the central govern-
ment via the NHIF (Joseph and Maluka, 2016). Resources collected
through CHF revenues, matching grants, user fees and NHIF reim-
bursements are referred to as ‘Cost Sharing and Insurance Funds
(CSIFs)’ (Ifakara Health Institute, 2013). The pooling mechanism of
these funds is defined by the councils. Key CSIFs stakeholders within
a council are described in Box 1 and Figure 1.
National CHF enrolment rate in 2015 was around 4.5%
(Ministry of Health Community Development Gender Elderly and
Children et al., 2016), indicating that the target of 30% enrolment
by 2015 had not been reached (Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare, 2009, 2015). Numerous studies have investigated reasons
for low enrolment. Among them are low quality of care, high pre-
mium rates, limited benefit packages, lack of trust in the scheme or
healthcare provider and failure to see the rationale of an insurance
scheme (Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Mtei and Mulligan, 2007;
Kessy et al., 2008; Stoermer et al., 2011, 2012; Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare, 2012; Borghi et al., 2013; Macha et al., 2014;
Maluka and Bukagile, 2014; Kalolo et al., 2015, 2018; Kapologwe
et al., 2017). Additionally, issues in governance were observed in
terms of insufficiently capacitated or functioning CHSBs, HFGCs
and WDCs and regarding the role of the NHIF in managing the
CHF (Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Mtei and Mulligan, 2007; Kessy
et al., 2008; Stoermer et al., 2011, 2012; Borghi et al., 2013, 2015;
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2013; Kessy, 2014; Maluka
and Bukagile, 2014; Mkumbo and Masbayi, 2014; Kalolo et al.,
2015, 2018; Joseph and Maluka, 2016). Some studies also described
problems of insufficient council management commitment, high ad-
ministration cost, inadequate supportive supervision, a weak medic-
al supply chain and missing mechanisms for service purchasing,
claim processing and risk equalization or cross-subsidization
(Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Mtei and Mulligan, 2007; Kessy
et al., 2008; Stoermer et al., 2011, 2012; Borghi et al., 2013, 2015;
Macha et al., 2014; Maluka and Bukagile, 2014; Joseph and
Maluka, 2016). Furthermore, inadequate fund pooling, insufficient
transparency and accountability, as well as poor data quality and
management were mentioned in connection with low CHF enrol-
ment (Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Kessy et al., 2008; Stoermer
et al., 2011, 2012; Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2012;
Borghi et al., 2013, 2015; Frumence et al., 2014; Macha et al.,
2014; Maluka and Bukagile, 2014; Mkumbo and Masbayi, 2014;
Kalolo et al., 2015, 2018; Joseph and Maluka, 2016). Lastly, ex-
emption policies were reported to potentially discourage people
from joining the CHF (Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Mtei and
Mulligan, 2007; Kessy et al., 2008; Nangawe, 2012; Idd et al.,
2013; Maluka, 2013; Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2013;
Macha et al., 2014).
However, little detailed evidence has been provided about how
CHF implementation is affected by council-specific CHF implemen-
tation decisions. These council-specific implementation practices,
which differ from one council to the other, include the overall CHF
administration and the definition of the premium and benefit pack-
age. Neither is there much information about how the success of
these council-specific CHF implementation practices is influenced
by the wider health financing context, meaning council defined user
fee policies and fund pooling mechanisms as well as exemption
Key Messages
• When looking at CHF performance, it is important to consider council-specific CHF implementation practices and the
wider health financing context.
• Exemption policies and healthcare-seeking behaviour influences negatively the maximum potential enrolment rate of
the voluntary CHF scheme
• Higher revenues from user fees, user fee policies and fund pooling mechanisms can set incentives for care providers to
prioritize user fees over CHF revenues
• Major improvements in CHF implementation practices would be needed to make the CHF work, but given the wider
health financing context and healthcare-seeking behaviours, it is questionable whether such improvements are feasible,
scalable and value for money
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policies and other health financing mechanisms. Hence, this article
aims to investigate council-specific CHF implementation practices
and how these practices and the wider health financing context
within a council affect CHF implementation and therewith poten-
tially enrolment.
Methods
Description of study councils
Two rural councils ‘A’ and ‘B’ from the same region were selected.
Both benefited from the ‘Initiative to Strengthen Affordability and
Quality of Healthcare (ISAQH)’, with which the authors were asso-
ciated and which aimed to expand CHF coverage through: (1) CHF
implementation training for all relevant stakeholders (2012), (2)
CHF forum (2013), (3) CHF radio spots (2012–14), (4) supportive
supervision on CHF data management (2012–14) and [5] village
sensitization meetings (2012 for both councils and 2013 for council
A only). Councils were chosen because of their difference in per-
ceived CHF implementation capacity as judged by ISAQH staff.
Council A was perceived as better performing than council B.
Relevant council characteristics and specific health financing deci-
sions (CHF premium, CHF benefit package, user fee policies and
fund pooling mechanisms) are described in Table 1. Supplementary
Figure S1 summarizes CHF administration activities reported to be
conducted by each council.
Routine data collection
Routine data relevant for the understanding of council-specific CHF
implementation practices (overall CHF administration and definition
of premium and benefit package) and the wider health financing con-
text (user fee policies, fund pooling mechanisms, exemption policies
and other health financing mechanisms) were collected at public
health facility and council level for the financial year (FY) 2013/14 or
the calendar year 2014 between February and March 2015.
Data collected at public health facilities
We collected data on the number of households enrolled in the
CHF, the number of out-patient visits by financing source (CHF,
NHIF, exempted, user fee), as well as the amount of revenues by
financing source (CHF, user fee, other) and expenditures from all
public health facility for each month in 2014. In council B, one dis-
pensary could not be reached due to its remote location.
Yearly averages for CHF enrolment, the number of out-patient
visits, revenues and expenditures by health facility level (dispensary,
health centre, hospital) were calculated for 2014 (if not specified
otherwise). Total council figures were based on health facility level
averages and the total number of public health facilities per council,
except where indicated otherwise. Revenues and expenditure were
converted from Tanzanian Shillings (TSh) to USD using the annual
average exchange rate for 2014 (1662 TSh¼1 USD) (Bank of
Tanzania, 2017).
The required routine data were often available owing to a data
collection sheet distributed to all public health facilities by ISAQH.
To cross verify the data and fill gaps, other available documentation
was used. This included CHF counter books, CHF register books
designed by NHIF, CHF membership cards, CHF receipt books,
out-patient registers, monthly or yearly out-patient or financial
health facility reports and cash books. In rare cases in council A
where no other data source was available reports from the CHF co-
ordinator or ISAQH were used to obtain CHF enrolment data. If
data for a particular month could not be found in any of the sources,
the average of available months was taken to compute the missing
data. In case this could not reliably be estimated, the health facility
was excluded from average calculations for that particular value,
leading to different numbers of units considered (N) in Table 2.
Box 1. Key stakeholders of Cost Sharing and Insurance Funds within a council (Figure 1)
Council level
The Council Health Service Board (CHSB), consisting of community and private health sector representatives, is the govern-
ance body overseeing the Council Health Management Team (CHMT) (Kessy et al., 2008; Kessy, 2014). The CHSB is
responsible for the management and administration of the CSIFs (Mtei and Mulligan, 2007; Kessy et al., 2008). This includes
mobilizing and allocating funds, issuing CHF membership cards to exempted households and verifying the collection and
expenditure of funds (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001). The CHSB receives technical input from the CHMT through the
Council Medical Officer. The CHMT is in charge of monitoring and assuring the quality of services provided (United
Republic of Tanzania, 2001). The CHF and NHIF coordinators are typically members or co-opted members of the CHMT
(Borghi et al., 2015). The CHF coordinator, who is supported by a council health accountant, oversees the operation of the
CHF and tracks membership, fund generation and use (Borghi et al., 2015). It is the duty of the council (often the CHF co-
ordinator) to claim the matching funds from the NHIF. The NHIF coordinator compiles the NHIF claim forms and forwards
them to the NHIF office. NHIF reimburses the council or directly the health facility for expenses based on the submitted
claim forms.
Ward and village level
The Ward Development Committee (WDC) at ward level and the Village Council (VC) at village level are in charge of sensi-
tizing and mobilizing community members (e.g. during the Village Assembly) and identifying poor households eligible for
exemptions (United Republic of Tanzania, 2001).
Health facility level
At facility level the Health Facility Governing Committees (HFGCs), composed of community representatives, oversee the
facility operations. They are responsible for the mobilization of financial resources to run the health facility and liaising
with the CHSB (Kessy et al., 2008; Kessy, 2014). The Health Facility Management Team (HFMT) enrols community members
into the CHF, collects contributions (CHF revenues, user fees) and completes NHIF claim forms (Kessy, 2014; Borghi et al.,
2015).
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Data collected at council level
At council level, Comprehensive Council Health Plans (CCHPs) and
annual combined Technical and Financial Performance
Implementation Reports (TFPIRs) were used to analyse the contri-
bution of various funding sources to overall health financing in the
FY2013/14. Except for the central government’s in-kind contribu-
tions through the Medical Store Department (MSD), funds outside
council accounts (contributions from multi- and bilateral partners)
were excluded as they could not reliably be tracked within the coun-
cil system (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and Prime
Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government,
2011). Yet, for reference the contributions from multi- and bilateral
partners in council A and B were budgeted to be 1 741 395 USD and
2 338 951 USD in the FY2013/14. In council A, receipts of money
submitted by health facility in charges and monthly revenue reports
from cash books were obtained from the health accountant. In coun-
cil B, no such detailed documentation could be obtained. TSh were
converted to USD using the annual average exchange rate for the
FY2013/2014 (1626 TSh¼1 USD) (Bank of Tanzania, 2017).
Cost of CHF administration and its financing sources
To explore CHF administration, which is handled independently by
each council, we investigated the cost of CHF administration and
how the wider health financing context, in particular other financing
sources, contributes to this cost. Therefore, an approach similar to
the methodology used previously for the CHF in Tanzania was
adopted (Borghi et al., 2015). Yearly recurrent costs required for
administrating the CHF at health facility and council level were esti-
mated for 2014. For this an ingredient approach was used, whereby
quantities of each resource were identified, and valued with the ap-
propriate unit cost (Drummond et al., 2005).
Costs were classified by resource (personnel, per diem, transport,
other expenses), financing sources (CHF, NHIF, user fee, other pub-
lic health financing sources, other public or non-public sources),
cost type (variable, fixed) and activity (mobilization, fund pooling,
stewardship, purchasing). For categorizing activities, the framework
of Mathauer and Nicolle (2011) was used. Personnel cost was
defined as the cost of staff time and estimated based on their salary
and time spent. When estimating the time spent on activities that
were not solely conducted to administer the CHF (e.g. HFGC meet-
ings), costs were apportioned accordingly based on information
given by respondents (e.g. proportion of time spent on CHF-related
issues) (Supplementary Table S1).
To identify activities, time spent, resources required and financing
sources, a pre-defined data collection template was used to interview
22 informants: CHF coordinator, health accountant, Council Medical
Officer and one responsible person for CHF administration at six pub-
lic dispensaries and two public health centres per council. However,
in council B only at one of the three visited health centres an inform-
ant was available and willing to provide the required information.
This resulted in 11 informants in council A and 10 in council B.
Details on cost calculations can be found in Supplementary
Annex S1. Overall, council cost was computed by multiplying the
Figure 1. Key stakeholders of cost sharing and insurance funds within a council. Solid lines indicate official reporting hierarchies, dashed lines indicate further
relevant interactions and stakeholders within the dotted box belong to the health facility level
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average health facility cost with the number of public health facili-
ties per council and adding the council level cost. All costs were cal-
culated in TSh and converted to USD using the annual exchange rate
for 2014.
Results
Routine data collected at public health facilities
Table 2 displays routine data collected at public health facilities rele-
vant for understanding CHF implementation in the wider health
financing context. CHF population coverage in 2014 was 11.0% in
council A and 1% in council B. Strikingly, in council A most out-
patients were either exempted or CHF members and only few paid
user fees. This was different in council B, where patients were either
exempted or paid user fees. Consequently, a big share of revenues
collected at public health facilities in council A came from CHF con-
tributions, while in council B the main source of revenues was user
fees. Council B had more than seven times higher total revenues.
This was primarily due to the greater number of patients paying user
fees and the flexible user fee amount, but also because of a smaller
CHF benefit package and bigger CHF premium (Table 1). Council
A is therefore losing out financially as a result of higher CHF cover-
age, a smaller CHF premium, a bigger CHF benefit package and
fixed user fees (Table 1). The percentage of revenues spent at public
health facilities in council A reflected the fund pooling mechanisms
in place (Table 1), with a single council level fund pool (account),
where only little cash was transferred back to the health facilities for
rehabilitation and renovation (Figure 2). In contrast, the proportion
of collected money spent was much higher in council B, with indi-
vidual health facility level fund pools (accounts). Generally, observa-
tions across health facilities revealed that reporting formats were
inconsistent, patient registers did not capture the financing source of
out-patients (CHF, NHIF, exempted, user fee) and in places with
more than one person consulting patients CSIFs data was not
consolidated.
Routine data collected at council level
To further understand CHF implementation in the wider health
financing context, Table 3 shows the contribution of various fund-
ing sources to overall health financing in the two study councils for
the FY2013/14 based on routine data collected at council level.
Funds are divided into funds approved, brought forward, received
Figure 2. Spending pattern of CHF revenues in council A for the FY2013/14. In
council B, no such detailed documentation could be obtained
Table 1. Description of study councils (status 2014)
Characteristics Council A Council B
Population sizea 250 000 400 000
Average household sizea 4.9 4.3
Number of health facilitiesb 38 59
Number of public health facilities
(hospitals/health centres/
dispensaries)b
27 (23/3/1) 25 (20/5/0g)
Perceived CHF implementation
capacity
Medium Low
Year of CHF introductionc 2003 2008/9
CHF premiumc 3.01/6.02 USDe,f 6.02 USDf
CHF benefit packagec,d Maximum of six beneficiaries from one household per
CHF card and unlimited access to all services offered
at any public health facility within the council,
including the council hospital
Maximum of five beneficiaries from one household per
CHF card with access limited to all services offered
at the health facility, where CHF registration took
place
User fee policyd ‘Fixed’ (independent of treatment): 0.90 USD at public
dispensaries or health centres including all services;
1.20 USD at the public hospital for registration/con-
sultation and various prices for medical supplies,
diagnostics or any other additional services
‘Flexible’ (depending on treatment): 0.12–1.08 USD for
registration/consultation and various prices for med-
ical supplies, diagnostics or any other additional serv-
ices at all public health facilities
Fund poolingd Cost Sharing and Insurance Funds pooled at council
level
Cost Sharing and Insurance Funds pooled at health fa-
cility level
Role of CHF coordinator Dental Medical Officer at council hospital Health facility in-charge (medical officer) at main coun-
cil health centre
aNational Bureau of Statistics (2013).
bSource: Comprehensive Council Health Plans of selected councils collected by SR and IM.
cSource: CHF reports of selected councils collected by SR and IM.
dSource: Informal personal communication and observational data from selected councils collected by SR and IM.
eCHF premium changed from 3.01 USD to 6.02 USD mid-October 2014.
fAnnual average exchange rate for 2014 (1662 TSh¼ 1 USD) (Bank of Tanzania, 2017).
gThere is a designated non-public referral hospital in council B.
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and spent. Funds brought forward are unspent funds from the previ-
ous year (FY2012/13). CHF revenues only made up around 2% of
total funds available for health (sum of brought forward and
received). The proportion of CHF money brought forward was high
compared with its share in the funds approved, received and spent.
This reflected the greater difficulty to spend this money relative to
funds from other sources. Council A had less problems receiving
(81% of approved budget) and spending (41% of brought forward
and received) CHF money in comparison to council B (0.3%
received of approved budget and 0% spent of brought forward and
received). In contrast to the CHF revenues, revenues coming from
other CSIFs were spent easier in both councils.
Finally, the spending pattern of CHF revenues from council A
(23 795 USD) revealed that the revenues were spent as stipulated in
the guidelines with at least 70% of expenditure on medicines and
supplies (Figure 2).
Cost of CHF administration and its financing sources
Table 4 shows personnel costs (based on salary and time spent) and
financial costs (per diem, transport and other expenses) for CHF ad-
ministration in the councils A and B. In both councils financial costs
only made up about 15% of total cost. Mobilizing people to join the
CHF (including enrolment) was the most resource-intense activity at
health facility level, both in terms of financial and overall cost. At
council level, stewardship of the CHF scheme caused the biggest
overall cost, but mobilization activities remained with the largest
share of financial cost. Fund pooling and purchasing only marginal-
ly contributed to the total cost because little time was spent on these
activities (Figure 3). In both councils, important drivers for financial
cost were CHF supplies (cards, receipt books), transport cost for
fund pooling and per diem cost for mobilization, fund pooling and
stewardship. Financial as well as overall cost for administrating the
CHF was about double in council A compared with council B.
Similar to the overall cost, time spent administrating the CHF in
council A was more than double the amount of council B (Figure 3).
It was however interesting that the number of hours spent by public
health personnel in council A was less than in council B. This was
mainly because in council A front-line workers at health facility level
spent less time on CHF administration (particularly mobilization)
than in council B (7% and 25% of a single full-time person at dis-
pensary and health centre level in council A vs 12% and 33% in
council B; data not shown) and a large share of this work was taken
over by HFGC members.
As a consequence of responsibilities being more equally shared
amongst stakeholders in council A (especially with those outside the
public sector), personnel costs in council A were financed to a large
extent by non-public money (Figure 4). In contrary, in council B per-
sonnel costs were mainly carried by the public sector as most of the
activities were implemented by public employees. Personnel costs in
both councils were exclusively financed through non-CHF money.
Remarkably, only 25% and 8% of the total financial cost for
CHF administration were directly financed by CHF revenues in
council A and B, respectively. The percentage in council A was
higher because these financial costs (CHF cards and receipt books)
were pure variable cost and depended on the number of CHF mem-
ber households. All additional financial costs for CHF administra-
tion were borne by other financing sources, including contributions
from NHIF and user fees.
In both councils, overall costs mainly consisted out of fixed cost
(data not shown). As a result, the administration cost per CHF mem-
ber household was lower in council A than in council B (Table 5),Ta
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although overall administration cost was bigger (Table 4). The cost–
revenue ratio was 0.50 and 0.92 in councils A and B when only the
financial costs were considered. This means the financial administra-
tion cost was below the premium paid by a CHF household. When
the cost of personnel time was included, the ratio increased to
around 3 in council A and 6 in council B, meaning administration
cost was more than three or six times above the premium paid by a
CHF household. If only considering the administrative cost directly
financed through CHF revenues, the cost revenue ratio decreased to
0.12 in council A and 0.07 in council B. This ratio was smaller in
council B because administration cost directly financed through
CHF money was the same for each household in either council, but
premiums were higher in council B. Most importantly, this meant
that there was >70% of the CHF revenue left to purchase medicines
and supplies and do minor facility renovations (cost paid by CHF
revenues/total revenues <0.3).
Discussion
Strikingly, although population coverage in council A was just
above 10%, only few patients at dispensary and health centre level
paid user fees. This clearly indicated that the people seeking public
care the most were the exempted and insured. The others were either
seeking care in the non-public sector, not at all or only at very late
stages, when they had to attend hospital level services (as indicated
by a high proportion of user fee patients for the hospital). This sug-
gested and confirmed previous findings that CHF enrolment was
likely to be affected by healthcare-seeking behaviour and exemption
policies, which stipulate free service provision to groups with a
higher likelihood to be in need of care (Mtei and Mulligan, 2007;
Macha et al., 2014). These factors also undoubtedly influence nega-
tively the maximum potential enrolment rate which could possibly
be reached with a voluntary scheme.
On the other hand, the number of patients paying user fees and
the council-specific user fee policy, CHF premium and benefit pack-
age seemed to impact the total revenues collected. Compared with
council B, council A was losing out financially as a result of high
CHF coverage (low number of patients paying user fees), fixed user
fees independent of the treatment received, a small CHF premium
and a bigger CHF benefit package. In contrast, council B had sub-
stantial higher revenues due to lower CHF coverage (greater number
of patients paying user fees), flexible user fee amounts depending on
the treatment received, a smaller CHF benefit package and a bigger
CHF premium.
Furthermore, the fund pooling mechanism in place had an influ-
ence on the availability of money and the subsequent spending pat-
tern at health facility level. This meant that higher revenues from
Table 4. Average annual health facility level, council level and council overall cost in USD by input, council, type of resource and activitya
for 2014
Council A Council B
Personnel Per
diem
Transport Other
expensesb
Total
financialc
Total
overalld
Personnel Per
diem
Transport Other
expensesb
Total
financialc
Total
overalld
Dispensary level
Mobilization 2735 0 0 127 127 (4%) 2861 (87%) 753 68 0 18 86 (10%) 839 (63%)
Fund pooling 103 0 68 0 68 (40%) 171 (5%) 197 0 68 0 68 (26%) 265 (20%)
Stewardship 134 86 30 0 116 (46%) 250 (8%) 160 11 65 0 75 (32%) 235 (18%)
Total 2971 86 98 127 310 (9%) 3282 1110 79 133 18 229 (17%) 1340
Health Centre level
Mobilization 1296 337 0 282 619 (32%) 1915 (76%) 1776 159 0 85 244 (12%) 2019 (79%)
Fund pooling 107 0 68 0 68 (39%) 175 (7%) 6 0 0 0 0.4 (5%) 7 (0%)
Stewardship 301 55 60 0 115 (28%) 416 (17%) 399 12 108 0 120 (23%) 519 (20%)
Total 1703 392 128 282 802 (32%) 2505 2181 171 108 85 364 (14%) 2545
Hospital level
Mobilization 3613 193 0 837 1029 (22%) 4642 (81%)
Fund pooling 154 0 68 0 68 (31%) 222 (4%)
Stewardship 496 245 67 39 351 (41%) 847 (15%)
Total 4263 438 135 875 1448 (25%) 5712
Council level
Mobilization 4288 2396 752 0 3148 (42%) 7435 (28%) 1823 1745 376 0 2121 (54%) 3944 (17%)
Fund pooling 1100 1092 215 7 1314 (54%) 2414 (9%) 2215 0 0 2 2 (0%) 2217 (9%)
Stewardship 10 238 2396 44 581 3022 (23%) 13 260 (49%) 9913 892 78 52 1021 (9%) 10 935 (47%)
Purchasing 3723 0 0 2 2 (0%) 3725 (14%) 6367 0 0 2 2 (0%) 6369 (27%)
Total 19 350 5884 1011 590 7485 (28%) 26 835 20 318 2637 454 56 3147 (13%) 23 465
Overall council
Mobilization 74 687 3599 752 4597 8949 (11%) 83 635 (72%) 25 758 3904 376 781 5061 (16%) 30 819 (49%)
Fund pooling 3945 1092 2043 7 3142 (44%) 7087 (6%) 6192 0 1364 4 1368 (18%) 7560 (12%)
Stewardship 14 710 4783 984 620 6387 (30%) 21 097 (18%) 15 107 1163 1911 52 3126 (17%) 18 233 (29%)
Purchasing 3723 0 0 2 2 (0%) 3725 (3%) 6367 0 0 2 2 (0%) 6369 (10%)
Total 97 065 9474 3779 5226 18 479 (16%) 115 545 53 424 5067 3651 839 9557 (15%) 62 981
aActivities were categorized according to Mathauer and Nicolle (2011).
bOthers included supplies (e.g. CHF cards and receipts, registration books, printouts) as well as rent, food and refreshment during meetings if applicable.
cValues in brackets indicate the percentage of total overall cost for the specific activity.
dValues in brackets indicate the percentage of total overall cost for the specific health system level (dispensary, health centre, council or overall council).
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user fees, a flexible user fee policy and fund pooling at health facility
level might have set incentives for the supply side to prioritize user
fees over CHF revenues, which also poses a problem for equity.
Thus, the situation in council B, where revenues from flexible user
fees were high and funds were pooled at health facilities, might have
provided little incentives for healthcare workers and HFGC mem-
bers to conduct CHF mobilization activities. At the same time, the
higher CHF premium and a smaller benefit package in council B
might neither have provided incentives for the demand side to join
the CHF despite the high user fees, which is in contrary to expecta-
tions (Kessy et al., 2008). This altogether would contribute to ex-
plain why enrolment rate was so low in council B.
Additionally, the decision in council B to pool and use the CSIFs
at health facility level led to insufficient documentation at council
level. This made it impossible for the council to know what CSIFs
were received at health facility level and how they were spent.
Neither did it allow applying for matching funds. Fund pooling at
health facility level also made it more difficult to put a mechanism
in place for balancing the risk across the many smaller pools, which
emerged as a consequence. Documentation was about to be
improved at the time when the study was conducted, but without
addressing the problem of matching fund application or risk pool-
ing. The latter problems were also reported from other councils else-
where in the country, whereby the fragmented risk pools were seen
as a challenge to equity (Borghi et al., 2013). In contrast, pooling of
CSIFs at council level in council A facilitated planning and budget-
ing as well as risk pooling and other CHF administration processes.
This was observed based on the bigger percentage of budgeted CHF
revenue received and available revenues spent as well as due to the
possibility to request for matching funds, track how available
revenues were used and allow for risk sharing through need-based
reallocation of funds.
Both councils were facing difficulties to spend CHF revenue, be-
cause of lengthy and cumbersome overall CHF administration proc-
esses attached to it. For example, in council B CHF money collected
at council level (prior to the implementation of individual health fa-
cility fund pooling) was stuck in the council account and could not
be spent because of not clearly defined processes. In council A, use
of funds was impeded by the closure of the CHF account and its
consolidation with other council accounts, which changed fund ac-
cess rights. Similar problems with fund usage have been reported by
others (Mubyazi et al., 2006; Mtei and Mulligan, 2007; Kessy et al.,
2008; Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2012; Borghi et al.,
2013; Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2013; Macha et al.,
2014). Also, not knowing the number of CHF patients treated at
each health facility from routine data impeded in either of the two
councils the possibility of risk-adjusted reallocation of the CHF
money.
Overall, these administrative hurdles had an impact on the qual-
ity of data available for planning and budgeting and made activities
Figure 3. Estimated annual number of hours spent on CHF administration
within a council by type of personnel and activity in 2014
Figure 4. Contribution of different financing sources to personnel and finan-
cial cost incurred for CHF administration by council in 2014. Percentage fig-
ures indicate the proportion financed by CHF revenues
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planned to be implemented through CHF revenue more unlikely to
happen. The problems of CHF administration additionally led to a
financial loss as matching funds could not be requested due to the
lack of household registration details and/or proof of money submis-
sion, similar to what had been noted earlier (Borghi et al., 2013;
Kalolo et al., 2015). Consequently, all these bottlenecks in adminis-
tration led to CHF implementation failures and therewith dimin-
ished potential positive effects of a council level health insurance
scheme. This may ultimately also have contributed to CHF member
dissatisfaction and low enrolment.
The selection of the same study approach as used previously by
Borghi et al. (2015) for assessing the cost of CHF administration
allowed for comparison across studies. Importantly, several key
findings could be confirmed: (1) lack of financial sustainability of
the CHF as such, (2) substantial personnel cost with a share of
around 85% of total cost, (3) workload of front-line health workers
in a very similar percentage range of a single full-time person, (4)
mobilization as the most significant task at health facility level and
CHF stewardship at council level, (5) similar relative cost of differ-
ent administration activities at health facility, (6) comparable aver-
age annual health facility level cost for an average dispensary in
council B and (7) higher cost per CHF member household in area
where enrolment was lower due to considerable fixed costs.
However, in our study we found the total annual council-wide cost
to be higher than what was published by Borghi et al. (2015). Yet,
detailed comparison with Borghi et al. was difficult because council
level cost only included stewardship activities and it was unclear
how dispensary and health centre costs were calculated given the
number of health facilities in a council and the average annual
health facility level cost. Consequently, cost to revenue ratios and
cost per CHF member households were also higher than reported
previously (Borghi et al., 2015).
In contrast to Borghi et al., we found in council A strong engage-
ment of HFGC members in CHF mobilization activities, which
reduced the burden of public health workers (Borghi et al., 2015).
This showed the importance of considering council-specific CHF im-
plementation practices and suggested that contrary to other places
in Tanzania, HFGCs in council A were well informed about their
roles and responsibilities (Kessy et al., 2008; Kessy, 2014).
Additionally, it was argued before that cost resulting from mobiliza-
tion activities could be reduced if all or most out-patients in public
health facilities were covered by insurance (Borghi et al., 2015).
However, we found that substantial mobilization activities would
still be needed even if most out-patients had insurance coverage as
seen in council A, where population coverage was just 11%, even
though only 8% of out-patients were paying user fees. This demon-
strated the relevance of taking into account the wider health financ-
ing context when looking at CHF implementation. Lastly, although
our results undoubtedly confirm the lack of financial sustainability
of the CHF observed by Borghi et al. (2015), they additionally
showed that because the CHF was built into existing structures,
there was considerable cross-subsidization in terms of financing
sources paying for CHF administration (e.g. national tax-financed
salaries, NHIF and user fee funds). This also meant that the CHF
would be left with >70% of its revenues to purchase medicines and
supplies and implement quality improvement activities at the health
facility. It therefor again highlighted the importance of other health
financing mechanisms in the analysis of CHF implementation.
Way forward
In-line with what has been suggested by others, the results made clear
that in order to make the CHF work, major improvements in CHF
implementation practices would be indispensable (Stoermer et al.,
2011, 2012; Mtei and Enemark, 2013; Kalolo et al., 2015, 2018;
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2015). Most importantly, our
findings showed the importance of considering council-specific CHF
implementation practices and the wider health financing context
when looking at CHF performance. Changes in CHF
implementation practices would need to go hand in hand with adap-
tions in other health financing policies (e.g. exemption, user fee, fund
pooling policies) as the CHF cannot be looked at as a stand-alone sys-
tem. It is highly questionable whether improvements in CHF imple-
mentation practices alone were feasible and scalable given the
council-specific CHF premiums, CHF benefit packages, user fee poli-
cies and fund pooling mechanisms as well as when taking into ac-
count the exemption policies, other health financing mechanisms and
healthcare-seeking behaviours. The question also remains whether
such efforts to improve CHF implementation were value for money
taking into account the already considerable contributions of other
health financing mechanisms to CHF administration and the small
contribution of the CHF to overall health financing.
Limited resources might potentially be better invested if in a first
place the focus was on improving processes of major health financ-
ing sources coming from central level (Block Grants, Health Sector
Basket Fund, Development Grants and MSD supply chain) in order
to increase resource utilization and predictability of funding flows.
This would lead more likely to a noticeable change in quality of
care, because even little improvements in these processes could free
up a substantial amount of money and human capacity. Improved
quality might then in turn increase willingness of the community to
contribute to health services as suggested by others (Bonu et al.,
2003; World Health Organization, 2013; Adebayo et al., 2015).
However, this would imply that for protecting the informal sector
from financial hardship, they would need to be at least temporarily
exempted from user fees until certain level of healthcare quality
could be guaranteed. This could obviously not be done without
increasing the level of funding for healthcare from central level
through existing or new innovative financing solutions (Gilson and
Table 5. Summary of cost revenue ratios and cost per CHF member
household for the year 2014
Council A Council B
Enrolment
Total number of individuals enrolled (%) 29 048 (11%) 4186 (1%)
Total number of households enrolled 5327 866
Premium paid by each household [USD] 3.46 6.02
Total revenues (including matching
fund) [USD]
18 408 (36 816) 5212 (10 423)
Administration cost [USD]
Cost paid by CHF revenues 4565 742
Financial cost 18 479 9557
Total overall cost (including personnel) 115 545 62 981
Cost revenue ratio (including matching fund)
Cost paid by CHF revenues/total
revenues
0.25 (0.12) 0.14 (0.07)
Financial cost/total revenues 1.00 (0.50) 1.83 (0.92)
Total overall cost/total revenues 6.28 (3.14) 12.08 (6.04)
Cost per CHF member household [USD]
Cost paid by CHF revenues/household 0.86 0.86
Financial cost/household 3.47 11.03
Total overall cost/household 21.69 72.72
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McIntyre, 2005; Dutta, 2015). Such changes may also have implica-
tions on several other parts of the system, including a potential in-
crease in service utilization followed by a possible drop of quality of
care (Gilson and McIntyre, 2005; Borghi et al., 2012; McIntyre
et al., 2013; World Health Organization, 2013). However, given the
problems with CHF implementation or CSIFs more generally, it
could be worth considering conducting further research in this direc-
tion and advocate for the most pro-poor and cost-effective ap-
proach. In particular, a comprehensive study ought to be done,
which compares the cost and other implications of abolishing user
fees with the efforts required for effectively improving CHF
implementation.
Limitations of the study
Some data presented were collected from routine data and its docu-
mentation might have been erroneous. Yet, by verifying the numbers
with additional sources available, it was assured to obtain data of
reliable quality. Part of the analysis could only be done in council A,
where detailed enough data were available. The lack of sufficient
data in council B further supported the findings discussed above. For
the cost calculations, also the cost of activities that would need to be
done in the absence of the CHF was included. Though, these costs
were apportioned according to the share of time spent on CHF ad-
ministration. Additionally, it could be argued that the sample of
informants providing costing information was too small to be repre-
sentative for the council. However, most findings overlap well with
what has been shown previously (Borghi et al., 2015). Finally, activ-
ities done by HFGCs were indirectly reported through the person re-
sponsible for CHF administration at the health facility. These
estimates could thus be overestimated. Yet, even if the reported val-
ues were halved, apart from the absolute values for cost and time
spent no statement reported in this study would change.
Conclusion
Our results showed the importance of considering council-specific
CHF implementation practices (overall CHF administration and the
definition of the premium and benefit package) and the wider health
financing context (council defined user fee policies and fund pooling
mechanisms as well as exemption policies and other health financing
mechanisms) when looking at CHF performance. Findings demon-
strated that exemption policies and healthcare-seeking behaviour
influenced negatively the maximum potential enrolment rate.
Higher revenues from user fees, user fee policies and fund pooling
mechanisms might have furthermore set incentives for care pro-
viders to prioritize user fees over CHF revenues. Bottlenecks in over-
all CHF administration diminished potential positive effects of a
council level health insurance scheme and may ultimately have
affected CHF enrolment. Costing results clearly pointed out the lack
of financial sustainability of the CHF. The financial analysis how-
ever also showed that due to significant contributions from other
financing mechanisms to CHF administration, the CHF could be left
with >70% of its revenues for financing services.
Given the wider health financing context and healthcare-seeking
behaviours, it is highly questionable whether improvements in CHF
implementation practices alone were feasible and scalable. The ques-
tion also certainly remains whether such efforts were value for
money, and if limited resources were not better invested through pri-
marily focusing on improving utilization and predictability of major
health financing sources coming from central level. Therefore, this
article calls for a realistic reconsideration of approaches taken to
address the challenges in health financing and demonstrated that the
CHF cannot be looked at as a stand-alone system.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online.
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